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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Forty-two-year-old George Lee Spencer was charged with misdemeanor DUI and 
other misdemeanor charges. Mr. Spencer tried to plead guilty to the misdemeanor DUI 
charge, but the magistrate did not accept the plea and gave the State time to amend the 
charge to felony DUI. Later, the State amended the charge to felony DUI. Mr. Spencer 
filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that he should have been given the opportunity to 
plead guilty to the misdemeanor DUI charge. The district court denied the motion to 
dismiss. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Spencer then entered a conditional guilty 
plea to the felony DUI charge, and the State dismissed the other misdemeanor charges. 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with one year fixed. 
Mr. Spencer appealed and filed a motion to augment, which the Idaho Supreme 
Court denied. 
On appeal, Mr. Spencer asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process when it denied his motion to augment. He also asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Boise Police Department officers stopped a car driven by Mr. Spencer for failure 
to maintain its lane. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 12.) 
Mr. Spencer had the smell of an alcoholic beverage coming from his car, and admitted 
that he had consumed alcohol. (PSI, p.2.) He failed the administered field sobriety 
tests, and provided breath samples that gave results of .132/.131. (PSI, p.2.) During a 
search incident to arrest, officers found a metal pipe that tested presumptively positive 
for marijuana. (PSI, p.2.) 
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Mr. Spencer was initially charged with one count of driving under the influence 
(second offense), misdemeanor, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, one count of 
driving without privileges, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001 (3), one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A(1), and 
one count of failure to provide proof of insurance (2nd offense), misdemeanor, in 
violation of I.C. § 49-1232. (R., p.14.) At his first arraignment, Mr. Spencer was not 
called on to plead to the charges. (See R., pp.104-05, 115-16.) The statement of 
defendant's rights given to Mr. Spencer at the time of his first arraignment specifically 
provided: "You may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at this time." (R., p.106.) 
Mr. Spencer did not appear for his subsequent pretrial conference, and a bench warrant 
was issued for his arrest. (R., pp.33, 40.) 
Later, Mr. Spencer was arrested on the bench warrant. (R., p.40.) Meanwhile, 
the State filed an amended complaint charging Mr. Spencer with one count of driving 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (2nd offense), misdemeanor, in violation of 
I.C. §§ 18-8004(1 )(a) and 18-8005(4), one count of driving without privileges (2nd 
offense), misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001 (4), one count of paraphernalia 
possession, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A, and one count of no 
insurance (2nd offense), misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 49-1232(3). (R., pp.35-37.) 
At his second arraignment, Mr. Spencer tried to plead guilty to all counts. ( See 
R., pp.116-17.) However, the State advised the magistrate that it believed that 
Mr. Spencer had two qualifying prior misdemeanor DUI convictions, and that the State 
might seek to amend the DUI charge to a felony. (See R., pp.116-17.) Thus, the State 
requested that the magistrate set the matter over without accepting a guilty plea, to give 
the State time to investigate. (See R., p.117.) Despite Mr. Spencer asserting that he 
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had a right to plead to the misdemeanor DUI charge, the magistrate did not accept his 
pleas. (SeeR.,p.117.) 
The State then filed a second amended complaint charging Mr. Spencer with one 
count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (two or more 
convictions within ten years), felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(6), one 
count of driving without privileges (second within five years), misdemeanor, in violation 
of LC. § 18-8001 (4), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in 
violation of I.C. § 37-2734A, and one count of failure to provide proof of insurance, 
misdemeanor, in violation of l.C. § 49-1232(3). (R., pp.45-47.) 
Later, the magistrate permitted the State to amend the DUI charge to a felony, 
and set a date for a third arraignment. (R., p.75.) At the third arraignment, the 
magistrate set a date for a plea hearing. (R., p.76.) The State subsequently filed an 
information charging Mr. Spencer with the felony DUI charge and the other three counts 
from the second amended complaint. (R., pp.92-94.) Later, the State filed Part II of the 
information, alleging that Mr. Spencer had been convicted previously of two or more 
felonies, and should be considered a persistent violator of the law, to be sentenced in 
accordance with l.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.98-99.) The district court entered a not guilty 
plea for Mr. Spencer regarding the new charges. (R., p.100.) 
Mr. Spencer subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the case, "pursuant to the 
authority of Idaho Criminal Rule [11 (a)(1 )], upon the grounds that such dismissal would 
serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the Court's [business] and 
for the reasons that follow." (R., p.102.) In support of the motion to dismiss, 
Mr. Spencer filed a memorandum asserting that "the failure to offer him an opportunity 
to plead guilty [at the first arraignment] is a violation of his constitutional rights under 
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Federal and State Law and therefore requires dismissal of the above entitled action." 
(R., pp.104-05.) While he was provided with the statement of defendant's rights 
advising him of his right to plead guilty or not guilty at the first arraignment, the 
magistrate set the matter for trial without asking Mr. Spencer how he wanted to plead. 
(R., pp.104-05; see R., p.106.) Mr. Spencer asserted in the motion and an 
accompanying affidavit "that he wished to plead guilty on that date to the then charge of 
Driving Under the Influence, 2nd offense, Misdemeanor." (R., pp.105, 107.) 
Additionally, at the motion to dismiss hearing Mr. Spencer's counsel stated: 
The plain language of Rule 11-1(A), Judge, is quite clear. The defendant 
may plead guilty or not guilty. When you combine that with the plain 
language of the advice of rights form that each defendant is handed at the 
time of the arraignment, No. 5 of that form again says, "You may enter a 
plea of guilty or not guilty at this time." And so we are relying clearly 
legally on the plain language of the statute, or the rule. 
The facts, of course, on the recording are quite plain [regarding the 
first arraignment], Judge, that [the magistrate] did not, in fact, ever offer 
Mr. Spencer the opportunity to plead either guilty or not guilty. 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.12-25.) In response, the State argued that "[i]t was a plea of not guilty that 
was entered by the court due to the fact that Mr. Spencer had requested the assistance 
of counsel." (Tr., p.8, Ls.12-15.) The State also argued that any potential violation did 
not warrant Mr. Spencer's remedy of dismissal. (Tr., p.9, Ls.4-15.) 
The district court stated that 
I just don't see that there is any issue in this case that would warrant the 
dismissal of the charge, even if, procedurally, it might have been better to 
say something of a different proceeding, I see no violation of any of his 
constitutional rights. 
I don't think, in fact, that anything that warrants a dismissal is 
present in this record. There is no Idaho authority for this proposition. 
There is no requirement about the moment in which a person must enter 
a plea. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.10-20.) Thus, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. (R., p.120). 
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Mr. Spencer then entered into a plea agreement with the State. (R., p.121; 
Tr., p.1 Ls.7-21.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Spencer agreed to enter a 
conditional guilty plea to the felony DUI charge. (R., p.121; Tr., p.13, Ls.8-9.) He 
reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
(R., p.125; Tr., p.21, L.21 - p.22, L.2.) The State agreed to dismiss the three remaining 
misdemeanor charges and withdraw Part II of the information. (Tr., p.13, Ls.9-13, 23-
24.) The State would recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three years 
fixed, and with the district court retaining jurisdiction, while the defense would be free to 
argue for less. (R., p.121, Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.4.) The district court then accepted 
Mr. Spencer's guilty plea. (R., p.121; Tr., p.26, Ls.16-22.) 
Mr. Spencer did not participate in the presentence process. (PSI, pp.14-15.) At 
the sentencing hearing, the State submitted on its original recommendation of a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, and with the district court retaining 
jurisdiction. (R., p.132; Tr., p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.3, p.30, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Spencer's 
counsel requested that the district court consider a commuted sentence, or alternatively 
a sentence lower than the one recommended by the State. (R., p.132; Tr., p.32, Ls.6-
20.) Both Mr. Spencer and his counsel sought leniency from the district court, due to 
Mr. Spencer's recent loss of his son. (Tr., p.30, L.25- p.31, L.4, p.32, L.22 - p.33, L.7.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with one year fixed. 
(R., pp.132-34.) The district court did not retain jurisdiction, telling Mr. Spencer, "I just 
don't see anything on your part that indicates to me that it would be useful to tie up the 
space in the rider." (R., pp.133-34; Tr., p.36, Ls.7-11.) 
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Mr. Spencer filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 1 (R., pp.137-39.) 
1 Mr. Spencer also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of 
sentence, which the district court denied. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration 
Under ICR 35 (Dec. 18, 2012). On appeal, Mr. Spencer does not challenge the denial 
of the Rule 35 motion. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Spencer due process when it denied his 
motion to augment? 





The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Spencer Due Process When It Denied His Motion 
To Augment The Record 
In this Mr. Spencer filed a motion to augment the record with transcripts of 
his first arraignment and second arraignment. The State objected, and this Court 
denied Mr. Spencer's motion to augment. On appeal, Mr. Spencer challenges the 
denial of his motion to augment. Mr. Spencer asserts that the Court denied him due 
process when it denied his motion to augment, because the requested transcripts are 
necessary for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged on appeal. 
Due process issues are generally questions of law, over which appellate courts 
exercise free review. Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501,510 (2006). 
The Constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Idaho Const. art. 
I, § 13. "The Due Process Clause guarantees every defendant the right to a trial 
comporting with basic tenets of fundamental fairness." State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 
248 (2008) (citing Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 425 U.S. 18 (1981), Turner v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965)). A defendant in a criminal case has a due process 
right to "a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors 
alleged regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002) 
(citing Draperv. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), 
Eskridge v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958), Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). In Idaho, it is the appellant's burden "to provide an 
adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of 
error, and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are 
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presumed to support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 
(Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). 
Mr. Spencer asserts that the Court denied him due process when it denied his 
motion to augment, because the requested transcripts are necessary for adequate 
appellate review of the errors alleged on appeal. See Strand, 137 Idaho at 462. On 
appeal, Mr. Spencer has raised the issue that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion to dismiss, because he should have been given an 
opportunity to plead guilty at his first arraignment. The requested transcripts of the first 
and second arraignments, which would document the opportunities (if any) Mr. Spencer 
had to plead guilty at those arraignments, are necessary for determining whether the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss. Mr. Spencer 
bears the burden of providing an adequate record upon which this Court can review the 
merits of this issue. See Coma, 133 Idaho at 34. Further, if the requested transcripts 
are missing on appeal, they will be presumed to support the district court's decision to 
deny his motion to dismiss. See id. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
Mr. Spencer due process when it denied his motion to augment the record with the 
requested transcripts of his first and second arraignments. Mr. Spencer should be 
provided with the requested transcripts. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Spencer's Motion To 
Dismiss 
Mr. Spencer asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to dismiss, because he should have been given an opportunity to plead guilty at 
his first arraignment. 
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While Mr. Spencer filed the motion to dismiss the case "pursuant to the authority 
of Idaho Criminal Rule [11 (a)(1 )]," the motion was filed "upon the grounds that such 
dismissal would serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the Court's 
[business] and for the reasons that follow [in the memorandum in support]." (R., p.102.) 
Thus, Mr. Spencer essentially filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 48(a)(2) motion to dismiss a 
criminal action: 
The court, on notice to all parties may dismiss a criminal action upon its 
own motion or upon motion of any party upon either of the following 
grounds: 
(1) For unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to the grand 
jury or if an information is not filed within the time period prescribed by 
Rule 7(f) of these rules, or for unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant 
to trial, or 
(2) For any other reason, the court concludes that such dismissal 
will serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's 
business. 
I.C.R. 48(a). "On its face, I.C.R. 48(a)(2) has two requirements: (1) that dismissal serve 
'the ends of justice,' and (2) that dismissal serve 'the effective administration of the 
court's business."' State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781 (1999). An appellate court 
"reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal action for an abuse 
of discretion." State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (Ct. App. 2012). 
"A defendant may plead guilty or not guilty. If a defendant refuses to plead ... 
the court shall direct the entry of a plea of not guilty." I.C.R. 11 (a)(1 ). In this case, the 
magistrate did not call upon Mr. Spencer to plead to the charges at the first arraignment. 
(See R., pp.104-05, 115-16.) This went against I.C.R. 11 (a)(1 ). Additionally, the 
statement of defendant's rights given to Mr. Spencer at the time of his first arraignment 
specifically provided: "You may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at this time." 
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(R., p.106.) Thus, mindful of Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630 (2010), 2 
Mr. Spencer asserts that he should have been given an opportunity to plead guilty at his 
first arraignment. 
Because the magistrate did not give Mr. Spencer an opportunity to plead guilty at 
his first arraignment, dismissal of his case would serve the ends of justice and the 
effective administration of the court's business. See I.C.R. 48(a)(2). Thus, the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Spencer's motion to dismiss. 
Mr. Spencer's judgment of conviction should be vacated, and this matter should be 
remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Spencer respectfully requests that the requested 
transcripts be augmented into the record on appeal. Mr. Spencer also respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this matter to the 
district court with instructions to dismiss the case. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 2013. 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
2 In Schoger, the issue was whether Idaho Criminal Rule 11 required a district court to 
accept a defendant's guilty plea. 148 Idaho at 629-30. The defendant argued that the 
word "may" in Rule 11 (a)(1) should be construed as mandatory, thus requiring a district 
court to accept an guilty plea submitted pursuant to Rule 11. Id. at 629. The Idaho 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "no provision of Idaho law, including I.C.R. 11, 
requires a court to accept a guilty plea." Id. at 630. "Acceptance of such a plea is 
specifically within the discretion of the trial court." Id. 
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